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Abstract 
The banking system robustness is an actual concern and a priority for EU and national 
authorities. Although Portuguese Agricultural Credit Co-operatives (CCAM) performance, as 
a group, compares favourably with that of other credit institutions, individual CCAM 
occasionally do enter in distress. The increasingly large size of the CCAM raises concerns 
regarding the resolution of potential distress situations given some of the cooperative 
governance rules. The main purpose of this paper is to evaluate CCAM risk of insolvency. To 
accomplish this objective, the authors analyze the CCAM failures in the period between 1995 and 
2009, adopting a Cox proportional hazards model. The model shows that Transformation ratio and 
Other Structural Costs ratio were important indicators to evaluate the relative risk of insolvency 
for CCAM. 
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1. Introduction 
The banking system robustness is an actual concern and a priority for EU and national 
authorities, due of its importance to the real economy and social confidence. There is a 
consensus that the key for prevention lays on a regulation improvement, including a set of 
creation requirements and the enforcement of prudential rules on the daily operations, and 
enhance supervision, monitoring the execution of those rules and requirements.  
Meanwhile, an effective supervision requires a constant process of inquiring and analysis of 
data and banking activity, consequence of the increasing velocity of financial innovations, the 
lap time to engage in fraud or simply mismanagement and the difficulty to detect bad 
practices. The direct costs and scary of resources make the inspections on-site prohibitive and 
subject to a restricted implementation. A healthy financial institution examined too often 
waste valuable resources; but if a problematic institution is not examined with the adequate 
frequency, the delayed will raise the resolution costs (Rocha, 1999). 
Although actual, banking system robustness is not of recent interest for researchers. To 
evaluate the banks financial healthy and determine the urgency of inspections on-site several 
models of prediction of failure were formulated. Those models offer regulators an early 
warning system that statistically discriminate problematic and healthy banks based on a 
selection of financial indicators. This system allows a better allocation of bank examining 
resources, helping regulators to detect institutions in financial distress before is too late. 
Different techniques were used to construct prediction of failure models, protruding 
discriminant analysis, logit and probit models. The aim of these models is determine the 
probability of a bank with specific characteristics fail. However, the predicted probabilities 
are of failure and not failure in a certain (not specified) point in time during a definite time 
period. The same as the techniques mentioned above, the Cox proportional hazards model 
provides information regarding the expected time of failure. This model generates a survival 
profile for banks, i. e., the probability of bank survive over a different specified time periods 
as a function of time.  
The recent financial crisis and subsequent economic recession highlight the strengths of co-
operative banks (The Economist, January, 23th 2010: 66), but also their weaknesses.  To the 
Portuguese case, there is no doubt that the improvement of co-operative banking performance 
is a strategic and operational matter to ensure the economic and financial survival of 
Agricultural Credit Co-operatives, CCAM (Caixas de Crédito Agrícola Mútuo). Although 
Crédito Agrícola performance compares favourably with that of other credit institutions, 
     
 
 
 3
individual CCAM occasionally do enter in distress as illustrated by history. The increasingly 
large size of the CCAM raises concerns regarding the resolution of potential distress 
situations given some of the cooperative governance rules. 
In particular, the restrictions on control rights and residual claims linked to the cooperative 
governance framework limits the range of options for resolving systemically important 
CCAM as it makes raising capital more difficult for these organizations. Vaguely defined 
ownership rights combined with restricted voting rights might prevent raising capital from 
existing and new members, particularly at time of distress when large investors are more 
likely to provide capital injections. In the past, resolution of CCAM typically involved the 
merge or incorporation of the weak CCAM by another CCAM (Cabo and Rebelo, 2005). 
However, this resolution mechanism is more difficult to apply to a large systemic CCAM. 
Also, CCAM regional orientation can be a strong constraint to find another CCAM able to 
absorb it, without losing their territorial identity. 
As a system, in the process of strategic planning, more specifically, in the phase of diagnosis 
and subsequent adoption of plausible prescriptions by the main stakeholders (members, board 
of directors, regulation and supervision entities) is important to know something about the 
survival of the units that integrate the system. In other words, is important to know the 
probability that a CCAM with a given set of characteristics will survive longer than some 
specified length of time into the future, and which are the characteristics that most contributed to 
the CCAM insolvency. The achievement of this objective requires the use of some sort of 
statistical model, a “survival model”, to translate CCAM characteristics into estimates of risk.  
The main purpose of this paper is to identify “problematic” CCAM and to evaluate their risk of 
insolvency as a function of financial indicators, providing CCAM stakeholders with a tool to 
predict bankruptcies with sufficient lead time to institute remedial action at these cooperatives. To 
accomplish this objective, the paper analyzes CCAM failures in the period between 1995 and 
2009 and adopts a Cox proportional hazards model that calculates the proportional risk of 
insolvency as a function of financial/economical indicators.  
Besides this Introduction, the paper contains six sections. Section 2 includes a brief 
description of the cooperative banking system in Portugal; Section 3 presents the Cox 
proportional hazards model; Section 4 includes the variables, sample and data. The results 
from this model are presented in Section 5. And, Section 6 contains the conclusion and 
suggestions for further research. 
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2. The Cooperative Banking System in Portugal 
The Cooperative Banking System in Portugal comprises only agricultural credit cooperatives. 
Its genesis goes back to the XVI century, to an institution called Common Barns, allowing 
farmers to keep stocks and seek financing. However, until 1976, the Portuguese agricultural 
credit cooperatives (CCAM) played a minor role in Portuguese banking activity, with a share 
of only 1% of total deposits and credit. Following the 1974 political changes and the country 
entrance to the European Union (EU), in 1986, CCAM were considered in the framework of a 
financing strategy for the development of the agricultural sector. So, during the eighties of last 
century the CCAM activity experienced a spectacular growth in their activity. This period, 
characterized by initial euphoria and disorganization, ends by the creation, in 1992, of a 
financial group, the Credito Agrícola group and the start of a concentration process in order to 
create stronger local structures by merging small local CCAM within the same region. 
Starting off with 220 local CCAM in the 1990s, it reaches 91 in 2009.  
The Portuguese Caixas de Crédito Agrícola Mútuo (CCAM) are local cooperative credit 
institutions, which capital is subscribed by their members, individuals and companies, linked 
to Primary Sector activities. CCAM are specialized in lending to agriculture and related 
industries, but bank with any customer type.  
Fulfilling is mission of “…contributing to the development of Local Communities.” (Crédito 
Agrícola, 2010), CCAM perform a crucial role in boosting local and regional socio-economic 
development, promoting social and territorial inclusion, by serving the lower social status and 
operating in impoverished regions1, and providing opportunities for qualified jobs.  
In the present scenario of increasing rural population exodus to big urban centres, private 
enterprise sector delocalizes and State rationalizes and closes public services in rural areas. 
CCAM stay and in many places they have a social function as well as a financial purpose.  
Presently, the Credito Agrícola is one of the main financial national groups (Table 1), having 
a significant position in the Portuguese banking system, namely, regarding employment, 
branches network and total deposits. A structural analysis shows that Crédito Agrícola has a 
high dependency of costumers’ deposits and presents one of the sector best levels of 
capitalization. 
                                               
1
 Crédito Agrícola market segment is inland and low income individuals. In terms of geographic distribution, over half of CCAM costumers 
(53.3%) live in the country’s inland regions. Its distribution across the regions means is present in many places where the economic strength 
has been sapped. Because of this, it has a very high proportion of costumers (more than 90%) on low and moderate incomes (Crédito 
Agrícola, 2008). CCAM have to be able to adjust to the real needs of its costumers.  
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Table 1 - The Biggest Portuguese Banks, by December 2008 
(Figures in EUR million and activity for Portugal only) 
  CGD BCP BES BPI CA 
 
Values Market 
Share 
Values Market 
Share 
Values Market 
Share 
Values Market 
Share 
Values Market 
Share 
Employment (n.º) 9.747 17.00% 10.687 18.64% 7.942 13.75% n.a. __ 3.858 6.73% 
Branches (n.º) 832 13.29% 918 14.66% 743 11.87% n.a __ 673 10.75% 
Net Assets 111,060 23.29% 94,424 19.80% 75,187 15.77% 39,963 8.38% 11,447 2.40% 
Equity 5484 20.83% 8559 32.52% 4653 17.68% 1315 5.00% 979 3.72% 
Net Profit 459 13.34% 201 5.84% 403 11.71% 360 10.46% 121 3.52% 
Net Loans  77,432 24.09% 72,372 22.51% 45,901 14.28% 27,941 8.69% 7,188 2.24% 
Total Deposits 60,128 27.60% 66,264 30.41% 26,387 12.11% 19,002 8.72% 9,158 4.20% 
Note: n. a. – not available; Market share in percentage. 
Source: Authors’ calculation based on company annual reports; Bank of Portugal and Portuguese Banking 
Association websites. 
Additionally, comparing the Group performance with other relevant national banks (Table 2), 
Crédito Agrícola presents an excellent position regarding efficiency, solvency, liquidity, and 
customers claims.  
Table 2 – Crédito Agrícola Position, by December 2009 
Performance Indicators Values Ranking 
Transformation Ratio* 87.0% 1st 
Efficiency Ratio** 49.8% 2nd 
Return on Assets (ROA)*** 1.0% 2nd 
Return on Equity (ROE)**** 12.2% 4th 
Solvency Tier 1 Ratio****** 12.0% 1st 
Costumer claims:   
Deposits: claims per 1000 accounts 0.06 1st 
Housing credit: claims per 1000 contracts 0.89 2nd 
  Checks: claims per 10,000 checks processed 0.06 1st 
Source: Crédito Agrícola (2010); Banco de Portugal (2010) 
* Net Loans / Deposits; ** Structural Costs / Net Worth  [Structural costs include amortisation + general administrative expenses + staff 
costs; Net Worth include financial margin + net commissions + other income (including results from financial operations)]  *** Net Profit/ 
Average Net Assets; ****Net Profit / Equity;      ***** Basic Own Funds / Weighted Risks (assets + off-balance-sheet items) 
 
Except for banking operations, the CCAM are ruled by following the traditional cooperative 
principles, namely, open membership, democratic control and restricted residual claims. The 
dual nature of credit cooperative is reflected by their formal and institutional solutions.  
The agricultural credit cooperative system in Portugal is made up of an integrated system 
(SICAM) of two types of cooperatives: the central and the singles (associated) in a regime of 
co-responsibility. SICAM = Central CCAM + Associated CCAM (91 local CCAM). 
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Altogether, they have 681 domestic branches in mainland Portugal and the Azores Islands, 
plus the 2 Offshore branches in Funchal and Praia.   
CCAM have freedom of association with the Central CCAM and they can operate outside 
SICAM, although the rules for this are more stringent and approximate more to those that 
prevail in other credit institutions. Currently, only five CCAM remain outside SICAM. 
The Central CCAM role has no parallel in the remaining financial institutions. Central CCAM 
is a financial institution under the cooperative form, offering a full service bank, competing in 
equal terms with the largest banks operating in Portugal. Being the main institution of the 
SICAM, Central CCAM represents the Crédito Agrícola Group domestic and internationally 
and is the top responsible and guardian for the running of the whole CCAM system, 
empowered by Bank of Portugal with supervision, orientation and monitoring competences 
over the associated CCAM.  
Considering SICAM specificities, the high degree of local CCAM autonomy, the 
organizational structure results in a governance model shared between the Central CCAM and 
the associated CCAM. 
As financial institutions, CCAM face the risks of the country’s financial system. The ability to 
efficiently manage financial risk will determine a CCAM’s survival in the competitive 
market. If the single CCAM, let alone the central CCAM, is structured to fail, the entire 
network can be prejudiced. It is therefore important that mechanisms are available to help 
identify high-risk CCAM with accuracy and within a reasonable time-frame. This 
identification can be made using financial ratios. The Cox Proportional Hazards Model is a 
powerful tool to assess the solvency of CCAM.   
 
3. The Cox Proportional Hazards Model 
The Cox Proportional Hazards Model has been used to help in the financial evaluation of 
banks, providing an early warning tool to predict failure and assisting decision makers when 
they are allocating resources (Braga et al., 2006).  
The Cox proportional hazards model presents three main advantages over other risk modeling 
techniques, such as discriminant analysis and the Logit/Probit model: it can be used to 
generate the probable time to failure; it does not require to set assumptions about the data’s 
distributional properties, and results from the Cox model are considerably more significant 
than results from the two noted alternative models (Whalen, 1991). Several authors compared 
Logit and hazards models in their ability to predict the insolvency and conclude that hazards 
models are superior (Lee and Urrutia 1996; Janot, 2001). 
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The Cox model (Cox, 1972) can be described in the following form [as in Rocha (1999), 
Janot (2001), Martins (2003) and Braga et al (2006)]. T is the time to insolvency of a firm, 
and S(t), the survival function, is the probability that the firm will be solvent longer than t 
time period, with S(t) defined by 
[ ] )(1Pr)( tFtTtS −=>=    (1) 
where F(t) is the cumulative distribution function of the time to failure. The probability 
density function of t is )´()( tStf −= . The insolvency time distribution can be represented by 
F(t) or f(t), and is described by the hazard function2: 
[ ]
)(
)´(|lim)(
0 tS
tS
dt
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dt
−
=
>+<<
=
→
                 (2) 
The hazard function, h(t), is used to calculate the probability of insolvency in the next time 
period, given that the firm survives up to time t. According to Cox and Oakes, (1984), there 
are statistical advantages to be gained by using estimate h(t) as opposed to F(t) or f(t). After 
the estimation of h(t), the F(t) and f(t) estimates are obtained by  






−−= ∫
1
0
)()(exp1)( uduhtF                            (3) 
and                 )´()( tFtf =                                        (4) 
∫
1
0
)()( uduh
 
 
is the integrated hazard function. It has no immediate interpretation but is a 
basic tool used to test model variables for aptness. 
There are different types of hazard models, settled in accord with the nature of the insolvency 
time distribution hypothesis. The proportional hazards model assumes the form: 
),()(),|( 0 ββ XgthXth =                           (5) 
Where, on the left side of the equation, ),|( βXth is the hazard function of a firm in time t; X 
is a collection of variables that is considered to affect the likelihood of insolvency; and β is 
the coefficient that describe how the variable affects the insolvency probability and will be 
estimated. On the equation’s right side, )(0 th and ),( βXg , are, respectively, nonparametric 
and parametric parts. The nonparametric function is the baseline hazard probability and 
depends only on time. If explanatory variables were centralized so that a firm with X= 0 has 
the same ratio values as the mean of the population, then )(0 th is the hazard function for an 
                                               
2
 The survival function, the density probability function and the hazard function are mathematically equivalent, so, if a function is given, the 
other can be derived. 
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‘average’ firm in the population. In a proportional hazards model the explanatory variables 
effect is calculated multiplying the hazard function of the average firm, )(0 th , by a function 
),( βXg of the explanatory variables deviations from its average values.  
In the Cox Proportional Hazards Model )'exp(),( ββ XXg =  and hazard function is 
represented by: 
)'exp()(),|( 0 ββ XthXth =                       (6) 
To determine the probability that a firm will survive longer than some given time into the 
future, the related survival function is given by 
)'exp(
0 )(),|( ββ XtSXtS =                     (7) 
where 






−= ∫
1
0
00 )()(exp)( uduhtS                          (8) 
is the baseline survival function corresponding to the baseline hazard function )(0 th . 
For estimate the model, samples of solvent and insolvent CCAM are needed and the time 
period before insolvency must be defined for both samples. Using this information, the 
baseline probability can be obtained; and with the estimated coefficients, the survival function 
can be determined by substituting coefficients of the relevant variables into equation (8). 
The insolvency event has been studied by several authors, searching for indications of its 
possible occurrence in way that the organizations can be adequately structuralized, reducing 
the possibility of bankruptcy. However, there is not a consensus regarding the definition of 
the insolvency or the adequate methodology for the construction of insolvency prediction 
models. To Emery and Finnerty (1997), insolvency occurs when a firm is not able to pay its 
debts. Altman (1968) considers that firm insolvency occurs when the shareholders receive 
profitability lower than alternatives supplied by the market under similar conditions. And 
Matias and Siqueira (1996) classified a bank as insolvent if it was under intervention or 
liquidation by the supervising entity. Similarly, Janot (2001) considers that a firm becomes 
insolvent when presents negative equity or if it’s impossible to continue operating without 
incurring into losses that would result in negative equity. This author also defines insolvency 
when an institution is placed under evidence by the supervising authorities. He concluded that 
the identification of a financial institution as a likely candidate for failure by bank regulatory 
agencies is a signal of insolvency. 
The literature treats the factors that contribute for a firm insolvency under distinct 
perspectives. Regarding banks, literature signs the influence of the macroeconomic aspects, 
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and frauds, management imprudence and consecutive losses (Fully-Bressan, 2002). Gimenes 
(1998) pointed external causes, as strong fall of demand, economic recession, governmental 
politics and radical and significant social changes; and internal causes, as management 
inefficacy and inadequate business strategy, inefficient productive system, extreme 
indebtedness, among others. 
Several authors use financial indicators to evaluate the firm risk of insolvency or bankruptcy.  
The first study on insolvency prediction was published in 1932 (Patrick, 1932 apud Kanitz, 
1978), where the data of 19 companies that declared insolvent between 1920 and 1929 was 
compared with others 19 companies well-succeeded. However the subject only flourishes in 
the 1070s with the use of statistical techniques; outstanding the Altman (1968) study, using 
the first widely spread technique to study insolvency: the Discriminant “Z-score” Model, still 
currently used in many European Central Banks.   
In the last decades several studies have been made on the subject, especially regarding bank 
failure (Matias and Siqueira, 1996; Rocha, 1999; Janot, 2001; Martins, 2003) but cooperative banks 
have been neglected. The works of Fully-Bressan (2002) and Braga et al. (2206) regarding Brazilian 
credit cooperative are the few exceptions. Table 3, in next page, offers a brief review of the 
findings of these studies.   
 
4. The CCAM: variables, sample and data 
As referred in section 2, the SICAM establishes a regime of co-responsibility between Caixa 
Central and its associates.  Central CCAM guarantees the associates without limitations and is 
also guaranteed by them. SICAM is, by this way, subordinated to a double guardianship. On 
the other hand, when a CCAM gets into financial distress, the Central CCAM have an 
incentive to protect this CCAM from default because is important to maintain the whole 
CCAM system with high reputation and confidence to the different stakeholders (depositors, 
loaners, Bank of Portugal ...). 
Thus, is not usual to see a CCAM bankruptcy. Indeed, although 28% of the 190 CCAM 
associated to SICAM in 1995 presented negative equity, over the period of our analysis 
(1995-2009), only 5 CCAM went bankrupted with their assets transferred to other CCAM. 
And between the 5 bankrupted only one belongs to the 28% group.  
Within SICAM management control are often exercised by Central CCAM that operates the 
orientation and supervision function and therefore, is the first to find out managerial failures. 
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Table 3 – Summary of Insolvency Relevant Financial Indicators 
Authors Relevant Financial Indicators 
Altman (1968) - Current Assets - Current Liabilities / Total Assets 
- Retained Profits / Total Assets 
- Profits before Interests and Taxes / Total Assets 
- Equity Market Value /Total Liabilities 
- Sales / Total Assets 
Kanitz (1978) - Net Profit / Net Assets 
- Current and long run  Assets / Total liabilities 
- Suppliers / Total Assets 
- Current Assets / Current Liabilities 
- Operational profit / Gross profit 
- Cash and equivalents / Total Assets 
Matias and 
Siqueira 
(1996) 
- Administrative Costs 
- Equity / Credit in liquidation  
- Total Revenue Growth 
Rocha (1999) - Financial Margin 
Fully-Bressan 
(2002) 
- General Liquidity= Current and long run Assets / Current and long run 
Liability 
- Short-term Liquidity= Cash and equivalents/ Short term Deposits 
- Personnel fees = Labour Costs to Total Revenue 
Martins (2003) - Banking Loans / Current Assets 
- Return on Assets 
Braga et al. 
(2006) 
- Liquidity = Current and long run Assets to Current and long run / Liability 
- Salary and benefit expense / Total Revenue 
- Total Loans / Equity 
 
In cases of coarse management failure or fraud, the management can be formally dismissed by 
the Central CCAM, under its supervision and intervention3 powers. Long-term inefficiencies 
can be solved through obligated4 mergers with more efficient CCAM. 
Additionally, contrary to the remain financial institutions Deposit Insurance Fund,  the 
Insurance Fund of Agricultural Cooperative Credit (FGCAM) besides secure the CCAM 
costumer deposits, performs an active role in the SICAM economic and financial 
restructuring process, as part of its task to promote SICAM solvency and liquidity. Rescuing 
                                               
3
 Central CCAM is empowered to intervene in the associates, by the assignment of a representative to track CCAM management or 
nomination of provisory directors. When it verifies a disequilibrium situation that, because its extension or continuity, can jeopardize the 
CCAM daily running, its solvency is at risk or serious irregularities occur. Plus, when the associated is in serious financial disequilibrium, or 
in risk of being, and unfollow Central CCAM guidelines, Central CCAM can dismiss total or partly of the associated management and 
supervision boards and assign provisory directors to them. Interventions have up to one year of lifetime, after that it can be renewed. 
4
 Although mergers are friendly (they must be approved by the general meeting) the influence of Central CCAM is considerable, being this 
top institution the trigger and even the one that choose the merger partners (Cabo and Rebelo, 2005). 
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operations FGCAM under the form of subordinated loans are conditioned to an economic and 
financial restructuring process, often including the CCAM incorporation in another CCAM.  
Because of this small number of CCAM that went bankrupt as defined, it was necessary to 
refine the definition of ‘insolvent’. Thus, a CCAM will be considered potential insolvent if: 
(a) present negative equity; (b) were subjected to a Central CCAM (or FGCAM) intervention; 
(c) were incorporated in another CCAM and follow-on a FGCAM loan and (d) present 
bankruptcy by any reason. In this way, CCAM that in the study’s period have not been a 
target in merger operations or subjected to a Central CCAM (or FGCAM) intervention are 
classified as solvent CCAM. 
As mentioned earlier, SICAM is experiencing of a profound restructuring era. The purpose is 
CCAM consolidation. According to a SICAM leader, mergers between CCAM, generate 
synergies and allow the creation of structures of internal control. Starting off with 220 local 
CCAM in the 1990s it reaches 91 in 2009. And the process will carry on until reach the ideal 
number of 70 CCAM (Portal da Serra: 21st November 2006) 
During the study’s period from initial 190 CCAM: 4 bankrupted; 100 merged or went 
incorporated in another CCAM; 89 benefit from FGCAM subordinated loans, Central CCAM 
intervened in 55 CCAM and following Central CCAM intervention, 40 CCAM merged or 
went incorporated in another CCAM. Table 4 includes the explanatory variables used in the 
current research. The variables selection was inspired on the authors’ previous studies on 
CCAM and from the literature review of insolvency. 
Table 4 – Variable definitions and transformations 
Group 1 - Credit risk management ratios Group 2 – Solvency ratios 
1. Transformation ratio = Loans / Deposits 
2. Credit overdue = Credit overdue / Gross Credit 
3. Credit overdue provision = Specific provisions / 
Overdue Credit 
1. Liquidity = Net cash and equivalent in Central 
Banks and other credit institutions / Total assets 
2. Debt to Equity ratio = Total liabilities /  Equity  
3. Indebtedness  = Total Debt / Total assets 
Group 3- Cost and expense ratios Group 4 – Return ratios 
1. Labours costs  = Salary and benefit expenses / 
Total assets 
2. Other structural costs  = Other administrative 
expenses* / Total assets 
3. Expenses ratio =Total expense / Total revenue 
1. ROC = Net Profit / Shareholders Capital** 
2. ROA = Net Profit / Total assets 
3. Financial margin  = Financial margin / Total 
assets 
* Costs of general services incurred in controlling and directing an organization, such as accounting, energy and water 
supply, advertising, office resources expenses, etc. .  * *The option for Shareholders Capital instead of Equity is justified by 
the existence of CCAM with lower equity resulting from previous years accumulated losses that can jeopardise the study 
results.  
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Data in our study are from fifteen year balance sheets of 190 CCAM associated to SICAM 
from December 1995 to December 2009. The 52 CCAM that present negative equity in 
December 1995 and 3 CCAM that went out SICAM during the study’s period were excluded 
from the sample. The first ones, because, by the study criteria, they were classified as 
insolvents, with a negative time to fail (T) which violates the Cox model assumption that T 
must be positive.  The seconds, the data available does not cover the entire period of the 
study. From the remaining 136 CCAM, 2/3 of them (92 CCAM) were randomly selected to 
constitute our sample. According to the study’s criteria, 52 of the sampled CCAM were 
grouped as solvent and 40 were grouped as insolvent (Table 5).  
Table 5 – Insolvency classification in the sample 
 Number of 
insolvent CCAM 
 
% 
Dec.  - 1996 2 5 
Dec.  - 1997 5 12.5 
Dec.  - 1998 6 15 
Dec.  - 1999 5 12.5 
Dec.  - 2000 3 7.5 
Dec.  - 2001 1 2.5 
Dec.  - 2002 3 7.5 
Dec.  - 2003 4 10 
Dec.  - 2004 4 10 
Dec.  - 2005 0 0 
Dec.  - 2006 1 2.5 
Dec.  - 2007 4 10 
Dec.  - 2008 1 2.5 
Dec. - 2009 1 2.5 
Total 40 100.0 
 
Summing up, the sample consists of data from CCAM whose time until insolvency (failure) is 
known and from solvent cooperatives that had not failed through to December 2009, the end 
of the period of analysis. The data from CCAM that had not failed during the study period are 
said to be censored. The 15 years study’s period is the censored survival time, once we only 
can state that CCAM survive at least that time in the future. The possibility of censoring the 
solvency time is another advantage of the proportional hazards model (Janot, 2001). The 
statistical procedures were implemented using SPSS software.  
For a solvent cooperative, the censored survival time is defined to be the time (in years) from 
December 1995 until the date of insolvency of its matched insolvent cooperative. Survival 
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time for an insolvent cooperative is defined to be the time (in years) from December 1995 
until the date of its insolvency (Table 5). 
Table A in annex offers the variables summary statistics for the year 1995. Comparing the 
information between groups, we can observe that, on average, regarding credit and risk 
management ratios, insolvent CCAM present higher Transformation ratio and Credit Overdue 
but minor Credit Provision ratio. Concerning the solvency ratios, insolvent CCAM, on 
average, present a minor Liquidity and Debt to Equity ratio and higher Indebtedness. In the 
cost and expenses ratio group, insolvent CCAM present a worst performance regarding 
Labour Costs and Other Administrative Costs. Expenses ratio is higher for solvent CCAM. 
Insolvent CCAM also present, on average, higher return ratios. This data show data insolvent 
CCAM are neglecting costs and maximising revenues. Insolvent CCAM leaders are less risk 
aversion than their pairs. They are engaging in a less cautious, more risk taken business 
strategy, far away from the typical strategy of the cooperative credit: “dull but safe”. Time 
seems to teach us that in the long run it was not the best strategy. Returns are fundamental for 
the sustainable economic development (and, in the end, survival) of cooperatives, but, 
cooperatives have a higher social purpose. They are organizations of the social economy 
sector, their mission is to promote the members’ welfare and, must of the times, it is contrary 
to profit maximization. 
Therefore, we can expect that the variables coefficients present the signs showed in Table 6. 
Table 6 – Variables Coefficients Expected Signs 
Group 1 - Credit risk management ratios Group 2 – Solvency ratios 
1. Transformation ratio  
2. Credit overdue 
3. Credit overdue provision  
+ 
+ 
-/+ 
1. Liquidity  
2. Debt to Equity ratio  
3. Indebtedness 
- 
-/+ 
+ 
Group 3- Cost and expense ratios Group 4 – Return ratios 
1. Labours costs   
2. Other structural costs   
3. Expenses ratio  
+ 
+ 
-/+ 
1. ROC 
2. ROA 
3. Financial margin 
+/- 
+/- 
+/- 
 
5. Results 
To determine which of the 12 explanatory variables presented in Table 3, are the best 
predictors of insolvency, following the same procedure of Janot (2001), a stepwise procedure 
combining forward and backward elimination is applied.  
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The model starts as a baseline model without any variable on it. The 12 indicators are 
considered one in each time and added to the model if succeeding in the selection criterion 
based on a p-value of 5% (Table B in annex). When a new variable is added to the model, the 
variables previously included are evaluated for exclusion, at 10% significance level. The ones 
who fail are excluded. When no more variables can be added or removed, the algorithm stops.  
The application of this approach provides the selection of only two indicators as relevant for 
the prediction of CCAM insolvency: Transformation Ratio (TR) and Other Structural Costs 
(OSC). Both indicators present a positive sign, as expected  
But, before analyze the models results; we need to check the respect of the model assumption 
of proportional hazards. The Cox model assumes that the hazard function h(t) is directly 
related to the hazard baseline function, ho(t), as an e potency, represented in (6). Figure 1 is 
used to check this assumption. If the hazards are proportional, the Log Minus Log (LML) 
graphs need to be parallels. Since variables selected are continuous variables, they were 
transformed into dummy variables, assigning the value 1 to observations below the median 
and zero for observations above the median (Janot, 2001; Martins, 2003; Braga et al., 2006). 
The graphs in Figure 1 show that Transformation Ratio (DumTR) and Other Structural Costs 
(DumOSCR) LML shapes. The graphs have sufficiently parallel shapes to confirm the 
proportional hazards hypothesis.   
Figure 1- Log minus Log function of model variables 
 
 
Figure 2 shows the Hazard and Survival Function of an “average” CCAM during the period 
of 1995-2009. As opposed to the survival function, the cumulative hazard function graphed 
presents insolvency probabilities after specific time periods.  
The survival function, graphed in Figure 2, show that an average CCAM had a 98.4% of 
probability of solvency in year 1. Similarly to the results of others studies (Rocha, 1999; Janot, 
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2001; Fully-Bressan, 2002) that probability decreases over time, reaching 61% of probability of 
solvency through the year 14.  
Figure 2 – Hazard and Survival Function at mean of covariates 
 
 
 
Table 6 presents estimation results from the selected model. The Table gives the estimate for 
each variable’s coefficient, the standard error of this estimate, the probability level that the 
population coefficient is equal to zero, its relative hazard value and the confidence interval at 
95% of probability.  
In the model of Cox the coefficient β does not have direct interpretation. The analysis of it 
must be conjugated with remain values of the function of risk of the equation (6). Thus, what 
is evaluated is exponential of the coefficient β, represented in Table 6 by the relative hazard 
(RH). RH can be interpreted as the predicted change in the hazard for a unit increase in the 
predictor. Also, according to Braga et al. (2006), RH is a measure of the contribution of the 
individual variable to the predictive power of overall model.  
Table 6 – Cox Proportional hazards Model estimation results 
Covariate Coefficient 
(β) 
Standard 
Error 
p - value Relative 
Hazard* (RH) 
IC 
(RH, 95%) 
Transformation ratio 0.926 0.350 0.008 2.525 (1.271; 5.017) 
Other Structural costs  1.227 0.371 0.001 3.410 (1.647;7.057) 
* RH=exp (β). 
 
Transformation ratio is an indicator of the CCAM prudential lending policy. It showed to play 
an important role in the determination of CCAM insolvency. The positive sign of this 
indicator’s β coefficient indicates that an increase in the Transformation ratio is associated 
with an increase in the probability of insolvency. The credit intermediation is the core 
business of banking activity; thus, CCAM main source of income lays on the differential 
between the interests paid to depositors and received from loaners. A high transformation 
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ratio seeks to boost this source of income, increasing the volume of loans. It is a high return 
but high risk strategy, since it displays CCAM to liquidity pressure and to a potentially 
reckless lending practice. Additionally, CCAM with high transformation ratio are more 
vulnerable to negative variations in the economic conditions affecting the costumers’ power 
to reimburse their loans and, thus, more open to credit overdue distress. The 2.525 RH means 
that the solvency hazards for a CCAM presenting a Transformation ratio above the median is 
2.525 times that of a CCAM presenting a Transformation ratio bellow it. Additionally, we can 
state, with 95% of confidence that these risk lays between 1.271 and 5.017 (Table 6). As 
Figure 4 show higher Transformation ratio is associated with higher insolvency probability. 
Remember that the blue line (DumTR=0) represents the CCAM whose Transformation ratio 
is above the median, and the green line (DumTR=1) represents the CCAM whose 
Transformation ratio is below the median. The vertical distance between the lines represents 
the estimated reduction (increase) in survival (hazard) probability for the higher TR CCAM 
relative to the lower ones at every time horizon. 
Figure 4 – Hazard and Survival Function for the covariate Transformation ratio 
 
 
 
Historically, Crédito Agrícola presents the lowest transformation ratio of the Portuguese 
banking system; it never presented a value higher than 90%, with positive influence in CCAM 
liquidity. This cautious strategy5 although negatively affecting CCAM profitability, showed to 
be, in the present scenario, the correct one. Indeed, with the entrance in euro, the Portuguese 
banking seek out, in international markets, for the funding needed to compensate the lack of 
internal savings. This took the transformation ratio of Portuguese banks to values far superior 
to 100%. With the current financial crisis and subsequent difficulties of gathering external 
                                               
5
 Central CCAM recommends a Transformation ratio of 70% (Silva, 2008). 
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funding, this practice is no long successful and puts domestic banks under liquidity stress.   
CCAM minor transformation ratio has positive influence in CCAM liquidity. This gives 
Crédito Agrícola an exceptional liquidity situation in the domestic banking system, with a 
comfortable net interbank position (net credit on other banks), with a positive balance of 
1.149 million euro (Credito Agrícola, 2009).  
The other indicator found to be of use when forecasting solvency was Other Structural Costs, 
which is a measure of the CCAM cost efficiency, of its ability to explore scale economies and to 
rationalize the expenses from CCAM administrative and organizational structures. The 2.525 
RH means that, as expected the results show that the solvency hazards for a CCAM 
presenting a ratio above the median is 3.410 times that of a CCAM presenting a ratio bellow 
it. And, we can state, with 95% of confidence that this risk lays between 1.647and 7.057.  
By rule, the expenditures items must to be always under CCAM leaders’ control. Banking is a 
highly competitive activity, were cost efficiency is crucial for success, thus, extreme 
expenditures will certainly result in financial problems. 
Figure 5 bellow shows that higher Other Structural Costs (blue line) is associated with higher 
insolvency probability. 
Figure 5 – Hazard and Survival Function for the covariate Other Structural Costs 
 
 
 
 
6. Final remarks 
SICAM double guardianship makes unusual to see a CCAM bankruptcy. In cases of coarse 
management failure or fraud, Central CCAM can dismiss CCAM management and 
supervising bodies and run the CCAM daily operations by appointing a provisory director to 
it. Long-term inefficiencies can be resolved through mergers with more efficient CCAM. 
     
 
 
 18
Additionally, CCAM deposits insurance fund also participates in CCAM rescuing operations 
granting subordinated loans to CCAM facing difficulties.  
Although effective, all these mechanisms are post event answers, with high financial and 
social costs and, more important, do not help to prevent the insolvency event. 
This paper offers a tool to understand CCAM risk of insolvency. The results show that the 
Cox Proportional Hazards Model is a helpful tool for the analysis of financial distress in 
CCAM, identifying variables that have a significant impact on CCAM solvency and 
describing the relationship between these explanatory variables and solvency. The results 
from Cox model indicate that Transformation ratio and Other Structural Costs are factors with 
a positive influence on CCAM insolvency. Specifically, CCAM presenting values for these 
indicators above median have a solvency hazard of approximately 6 (2.525+ 3.410) times that 
of a CCAM presenting a value bellow it. 
The estimated model also generates the probability that a cooperative will survive longer than 
t time units, serving as an early warning, signing potential insolvent CCAM and providing the 
expected time to fail.  
Given the values for a particular CCAM’s explanatory variables, the Cox model can be used 
to predict (through calculation of the probability in (7)) if the CCAM will survive longer than 
t years. This is a task for further research. Additionally, also the evolution of CCAM relevant 
indicators of insolvency risk consequence of the natural development of banking activity and 
the changes in banking environment can be an interesting subject for future research. 
Finally, the requirement of dummy variables to implement the Cox model diminishes its 
potential for revealing insolvency indicators. Several statistic measures and methods (median, 
mean, mode, ordinary least squares and maximum likelihood residuals, and so on) have been 
used to transform continuous variables in dummy variables but they are all ad hoc criterions.  
Without a supporting (economic, banking or management) theory behind it, this 
dichotomization can produce bizarre (and contrary to the expected) results, as in the Fully-
Bressan (2002) study. 
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Table A – Summary Statistics 
All Sample  
 #  Cases Mean Median Std. Deviation Max Min 
Transformation ratio 92 0.567 0.571 0.171 1.299 0.226 
Credit overdue 92 0.126 0.118 0.073 0.3025 0.000 
Credit overdue provision 92 0.492 0.452 0.376 3.314 0.000 
Liquidity 92 0.472 0.474 0.141 0.756 0.131 
Debt to Equity ratio 92 35.981 20.947 68.058 587.806 2.683 
Indebtedness 92 0.942 0.954 0.043 0.998 0.729 
Labours costs   92 0.014 0.013 0.005 0.0334 0.005 
Other structural costs   92 0.008 0.007 0.003 0.018 0.003 
Expenses ratio 92 0.901 0.917 0.102 1.2723 0.606 
ROC 92 0.576 0.302 1.092 7.738 -0.662 
ROA 92 0.013 0.010 0.016 0.097 -0.031 
Financial margin   92 0.043 0.040 0.013 0.097 0.009 
Insolvent CCAM 
 #  Cases Mean Median Std. Deviation Max Min 
Transformation ratio 40 0.637 0.635 0.160 1.299 0.284 
Credit overdue 40 0.131 0.146 0.078 0.296 0.000 
Credit overdue provision 40 0.436 0.435 0.257 1.593 0.000 
Liquidity 40 0.422 0.415 0.137 0.756 0.131 
Debt to Equity ratio 40 34.983 24.043 34.515 175.559 5.584 
Indebtedness 40 0.951 0.959 0.035 0.994 0.848 
Labours costs   40 0.015 0.014 0.006 0.034 0.005 
Other structural costs   40 0.009 0.009 0.003 0.018 0.004 
Expenses ratio 40 0.892 0.898 0.126 1.273 0.606 
ROC 40 0.870 0.394 1.565 7.738 -0.662 
ROA 40 0.016 0.013 0.021 0.097 -0.031 
Financial margin   40 0.048 0.044 0.015 0.097 0.020 
Solvent CCAM 
 #  Cases Mean Median Std. Deviation Max Min 
Transformation ratio 52 0.513 0.489 0.161 0.940 0.226 
Credit overdue 52 0.122 0.114 0.069 0.302 0.026 
Credit overdue provision 52 0.535 0.467 0.444 3.314 0.082 
Liquidity 52 0.511 0.507 0.133 0.748 0.269 
Debt to Equity ratio 52 36.749 19.455 85.746 587.806 2.684 
Indebtedness 52 0.935 0.951 0.047 0.998 0.729 
Labours costs   52 0.013 0.012 0.004 0.023 0.005 
Other structural costs   52 0.007 0.006 0.002 0.015 0.003 
Expenses ratio 52 0.909 0.924 0.079 1.117 0.606 
ROC 52 0.351 0.266 0.367 1.771 -0.241 
ROA 52 0.011 0.009 0.011 0.064 -0.014 
Financial margin   52 0.037 0.037 0.010 0.058 0.009 
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Table B – Summary results of covariates 
 score p-value 
Credit Overdue 0.849 0.357 
Transformation ratio 11.573 0.001 
Credit Overdue Provision 0.845 0.381 
Debt 0.858 0.354 
Debt to Equity ratio 0.250 0.617 
Return on Assets 0.154 0.695 
Return on Shareholders Capital 1.733 0.188 
Financial Margin 6.517 0.011 
Labour Costs 1.984 0.154 
Other Structural Costs 16.371 0.000 
Expenses 0.154 0.695 
Liquidity 11.394 0.001 
 
 
 
 
 
